On Strengthening the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision: Proper Ordinal Interval Operators

被引:0
|
作者
Booth, Richard [1 ]
Chandler, Jake [2 ]
机构
[1] Cardiff Univ, Cardiff, S Glam, Wales
[2] La Trobe Univ, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
基金
澳大利亚研究理事会;
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Darwiche and Pearl's seminal 1997 article outlined a number of baseline principles for a logic of iterated belief revision. These principles, the DP postulates, have been supplemented in a number of alternative ways. Most suggestions have resulted in a form of 'reductionism' that identifies belief states with orderings of worlds. However, this position has recently been criticised as being unacceptably strong. Other proposals, such as the popular principle (P), aka 'Independence', characteristic of 'admissible' operators, remain commendably more modest. In this paper, we supplement the DP postulates and (P) with a number of novel conditions. While the DP postulates constrain the relation between a prior and a posterior conditional belief set, our new principles notably govern the relation between two posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by different revisions. We show that operators from the resulting family, which subsumes both lexicographic and restrained revision, can be represented as relating belief states associated with a 'proper ordinal interval' (POI) assignment, a structure more fine-grained than a simple ordering of worlds. We close the paper by noting that these operators satisfy iterated versions of many AGM era postulates, including Superexpansion, that are not sound for admissible operators in general.
引用
收藏
页码:210 / 219
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] On strengthening the logic of iterated belief revision: Proper ordinal interval operators
    Booth, Richard
    Chandler, Jake
    [J]. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2020, 285 : CP3 - U33
  • [2] On the logic of iterated belief revision
    Darwiche, A
    Pearl, J
    [J]. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 1997, 89 (1-2) : 1 - 29
  • [3] Iterated belief revision and conditional logic
    Giordano L.
    Gliozzi V.
    Olivetti N.
    [J]. Studia Logica, 2002, 70 (1) : 23 - 47
  • [4] A conditional logic for iterated belief revision
    Giordano, L
    Gliozzi, V
    Olivetti, N
    [J]. ECAI 2000: 14TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, PROCEEDINGS, 2000, 54 : 28 - 32
  • [5] Iterated Belief Base Revision: A Dynamic Epistemic Logic Approach
    Souza, Marlo
    Moreira, Alvaro
    Vieira, Renata
    [J]. THIRTY-THIRD AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE / THIRTY-FIRST INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE / NINTH AAAI SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2019, : 3076 - 3083
  • [6] Iterated Belief Revision
    Stalnaker, Robert
    [J]. ERKENNTNIS, 2009, 70 (02) : 189 - 209
  • [7] Iterated Belief Revision
    Robert Stalnaker
    [J]. Erkenntnis, 2009, 70 : 189 - 209
  • [8] SOME COMPLETENESS THEOREMS IN THE DYNAMIC DOXASTIC LOGIC OF ITERATED BELIEF REVISION
    Segerberg, Krister
    [J]. REVIEW OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC, 2010, 3 (02): : 228 - 246
  • [9] Iterated belief revision, revised
    Jin, Yi
    Thielscher, Michael
    [J]. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2007, 171 (01) : 1 - 18
  • [10] The complexity of iterated belief revision
    Liberatore, P
    [J]. DATABASE THEORY - ICDT'97, 1997, 1186 : 276 - 290