The reactive bargaining set for cooperative games

被引：2
|
作者：
Granot, Daniel [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ British Columbia, Sauder Sch Business, Vancouver, BC V5Z 1M9, Canada
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2010年 / 39卷 / 1-2期
基金：
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词：
Cooperative game; Bargaining set; Reactive bargaining set; Kernel; Assignment game; KERNEL; CORE;
D O I：
10.1007/s00182-009-0201-6
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We introduce a new bargaining set for cooperative games in characteristic function form, and investigate its structure and properties. We prove that the new bargaining set is not empty. In fact, we show that it contains the kernel and is contained in the classical bargaining set M(1)(i), and we further prove that it consists of the unique symmetric vector for the class of simple majority games.
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页码：163 / 170
页数：8
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