A robust test for consumer welfare enhancing mergers among sellers of a homogeneous product

被引：28

作者：

Froeb, LM

Werden, GJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] US Dept Justice, Antitrust Div, Washington, DC 20530 USA

[2] Vanderbilt Univ, Owen Grad Sch Management, Nashville, TN 37203 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1998年 / 58卷 / 03期

关键词：

antitrust; mergers; Cournot;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00287-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Antitrust enforcement agencies and courts use net effect on price as a touchstone for the legality of mergers. This paper derives a simple condition for implementing that standard when industry equilibrium is static Nash in quantities (Cournot), and that condition is robust to different specifications of demand and cost. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.

引用

页码：367 / 369

页数：3

共 4 条

[1] A robust test for consumer welfare enhancing mergers among sellers of differentiated products
Werden, GJ
[J]. JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1996, 44 (04): : 409 - 413
[2] WELFARE-ENHANCING MERGERS UNDER PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
Kao, Tina
Menezes, Flavio
[J]. MANCHESTER SCHOOL, 2010, 78 (04): : 290 - 301
[3] Product differentiation, cost-reducing mergers, and consumer welfare
Norman, G
Pepall, L
Richards, D
[J]. CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE, 2005, 38 (04): : 1204 - 1223
[4] Identifying a dominant firm's market power among sellers of a homogeneous product: an application to Alcoa
Yang, SPN
[J]. APPLIED ECONOMICS, 2002, 34 (11) : 1411 - 1419

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