Negligence, Ignorance and the Demand for Liability Insurance

被引:4
|
作者
Bajtelsmit, Vickie [1 ]
Thistle, Paul [2 ]
机构
[1] Colorado State Univ, Dept Finance & Real Estate, Ft Collins, CO 80523 USA
[2] Univ Nevada, Dept Finance, Las Vegas, NV 89154 USA
来源
GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW | 2009年 / 34卷 / 02期
关键词
information; tort; moral hazard; screening; ADVERSE SELECTION; INFORMATION; MARKETS; RISK;
D O I
10.1057/grir.2009.4
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper considers whether lack of information regarding risk exposures can lead to a demand for negligence liability insurance. We find that, under the uniform negligence rule, such as the "reasonable person'' standard used to determine negligence in the U.S. and other countries, the value of information is positive and any demand for liability insurance must come from informed individuals. The necessary and sufficient condition is that good risks find it less costly to be negligent and purchase insurance. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review (2009) 34, 105-116. doi: 10.1057/grir.2009.4
引用
收藏
页码:105 / 116
页数:12
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