Tariffs, technology licensing and adoption

被引：6
|
作者：
Chen, Hsiu-Li [1 ]
Hwang, Hong [2 ,3 ]
Mukherjee, Arijit [4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ]
Shih, Pei-Cyuan [1 ]
机构：
[1] Ming Chuan Univ, Dept Int Business, 250,Sec 5,Zhongshan N Rd, Taipei 111, Taiwan
[2] Natl Taiwan Univ, Dept Econ, 1,Sec 4,Roosevelt Rd, Taipei 106, Taiwan
[3] Acad Sinica, RCHSS, 128,Sec 2,Acad Rd, Taipei 115, Taiwan
[4] Univ Nottingham, Sch Business, Univ Pk, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
[5] Univ Loughborough, CFGE, Loughborough LE11 3TU, Leics, England
[6] CESifo, Poschingerstr 5, D-81679 Munich, Germany
[7] INFER, Poschingerstr 5, D-81679 Munich, Germany
[8] City Univ Hong Kong, RCIE, Tat Chee Ave, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
来源：
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE | 2016年 / 43卷
关键词：
Licensing; Technology adoption; Tariffs; WELFARE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.iref.2016.02.012
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper develops a two-country Cournot duopoly model to investigate the implications of international technology licensing. It is shown that if the tariff imposed by the domestic country is high, it is optimal for the foreign firm to adopt an inferior technology for its production when it licenses its most advanced technology to the domestic firm. Such a licensing arrangement may improve welfare of the two countries. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：234 / 240
页数：7
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