Discriminatory power and pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the lottery Blotto game

被引:6
|
作者
Xu, Jin [1 ]
Zhou, Junjie [2 ]
机构
[1] Shandong Univ, Jinan, Shandong, Peoples R China
[2] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, 1 Arts Link, Singapore 117570, Singapore
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Lottery Blotto game; Pure strategy Nash equilibrium; Discriminatory power; Existence; CONTESTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.orl.2018.05.004
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper highlights the role of discriminatory power in showing the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a two-player lottery Blotto game. Precisely, when the discriminatory power of the contest success function in every battle is less than or equal to one, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists for any prizes and budgets. However, we construct examples in which pure strategy Nash equilibrium fails to exist as long as the discriminatory power of only one battle exceeds one. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:424 / 429
页数:6
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