This paper highlights the role of discriminatory power in showing the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a two-player lottery Blotto game. Precisely, when the discriminatory power of the contest success function in every battle is less than or equal to one, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists for any prizes and budgets. However, we construct examples in which pure strategy Nash equilibrium fails to exist as long as the discriminatory power of only one battle exceeds one. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Tsinghua Univ, Dept Phys, Fundamental Sci Math & Phys, Beijing 100084, Peoples R ChinaTsinghua Univ, Dept Phys, Fundamental Sci Math & Phys, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
Li, Xinmi
Zheng, Jie
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Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R ChinaTsinghua Univ, Dept Phys, Fundamental Sci Math & Phys, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
机构:
Korea Univ, Dept Math, 145 Anam Ro, Seoul 02841, South KoreaKorea Univ, Dept Math, 145 Anam Ro, Seoul 02841, South Korea
Kim, Bara
Kim, Jeongsim
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Chungbuk Natl Univ, Dept Math Educ, 1 Chungdae Ro, Cheongju 28644, Chungbuk, South KoreaKorea Univ, Dept Math, 145 Anam Ro, Seoul 02841, South Korea
机构:
Sun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, 135 Xingangxi Rd, Guangzhou 510275, Peoples R ChinaSun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, 135 Xingangxi Rd, Guangzhou 510275, Peoples R China
Jiao, Qian
Xu, Jin
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Shandong Univ, Sch Math, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China
Shandong Univ, Sch Management, Jinan 250100, Peoples R ChinaSun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, 135 Xingangxi Rd, Guangzhou 510275, Peoples R China