The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap

被引：6

作者：

Loertscher, Simon ^{[1
]}

Mezzetti, Claudio ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Melbourne, Dept Econ, Level 4,FBE Bldg 433,11 Barry St, Parkville, Vic 3010, Australia

[2] Univ Queensland, Sch Econ, Level 6,Colin Clark Bldg 39, St Lucia, Qld 4072, Australia

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2019年 / 84卷

基金：

澳大利亚研究理事会;

关键词：

Deficit; VCG mechanism; Multi-dimensional types; Multi-unit traders; EFFICIENT; ALLOCATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We prove that the deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction for a homogeneous good with multi-unit traders with multi-dimensional types is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap. We also show that as the number of traders grows large the aggregate deficit is bounded below by the ratio of the Walrasian price and the elasticity of excess supply at the Walrasian price. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：101 / 106

页数：6