AGENCY COSTS AND DIVIDENDS

被引:0
|
作者
Sejkora, Frantisek [1 ]
Horcicka, Ales [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pardubice, Pardubice, Czech Republic
关键词
agency costs; dividend; shareholder; management; creditor;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Creditors, shareholders and management enter into negotiations for various reasons. Reaching the consensus among all these participants is costly in the sense of difficult finding the best solution for all parties. It is often necessary to choose at best the "second best" solution to ensure compliance. At present, the costs of representation are one of the most significant factors that may affect the market value of the company. The theory states that dividends may reduce the costs of representation. In this context, the article deals with the following conflicts between: 1) shareholders and management, 2) minority and majority shareholders and 3) shareholders and creditors linked to dividends.
引用
收藏
页码:55 / 61
页数:7
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Culture, agency costs, and dividends
    Fidrmuc, Jana P.
    Jacob, Marcus
    JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS, 2010, 38 (03) : 321 - 339
  • [2] Dividends, Values and Agency Costs in REITs
    Chou, Wen-Hsiu
    Hardin, William G., III
    Hill, Matthew D.
    Kelly, G. Wayne
    JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, 2013, 46 (01): : 91 - 114
  • [3] Dividends, Corporate Monitors and Agency Costs
    Borokhovich, Kenneth
    Brunarski, Kelly
    Harman, Yvette
    Kehr, James
    FINANCIAL REVIEW, 2005, 40 (01) : 37 - 65
  • [4] Dividends, Values and Agency Costs in REITs
    Wen-Hsiu Chou
    William G. Hardin
    Matthew D. Hill
    G. Wayne Kelly
    The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2013, 46 : 91 - 114
  • [5] Bank dividends, agency costs and shareholder and creditor rights
    Lepetit, L.
    Meslier, C.
    Strobel, F.
    Wardhana, L.
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, 2018, 56 : 93 - 111
  • [6] Dividends and Directors: Do Outsiders Reduce Agency Costs?
    Belden, Susan
    Fister, Todd
    Knapp, Bob
    BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW, 2005, 110 (02) : 171 - 180
  • [7] 2 AGENCY-COST EXPLANATIONS OF DIVIDENDS
    EASTERBROOK, FH
    AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1984, 74 (04): : 650 - 659
  • [8] Dividends and debt with managerial agency and lender holdup
    Kanatas, G
    Qi, JP
    MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2004, 50 (09) : 1249 - 1260
  • [9] Dividends and taxes: The moderating role of agency conflicts
    Berzins, Janis
    Bohren, Oyvind
    Stacescu, Bogdan
    JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2019, 58 : 583 - 604
  • [10] Option pricing and replication with transaction costs and dividends
    Perrakis, S
    Lefoll, J
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL, 2000, 24 (11-12): : 1527 - 1561