Three kinds of worlds and two kinds of truth

被引：3
|
作者：
Spohn, Wolfgang [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Konstanz, Dept Philosophy, D-78457 Constance, Germany
来源：
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2016年 / 173卷 / 05期
关键词：
Possible worlds; Metaphyiscal possiblity; Epistemic possibility; Correspondence truth; Pragmatic truth; Essentialism; Two-dimensional semantics;
D O I：
10.1007/s11098-015-0549-3
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
This paper argues for three kinds of possible worlds: Wittgensteinian totalities of facts, Lewisian worlds or universes, concrete objects of maximal essence, and the world, a concrete object of minimal essence. It moreover explains that correspondence truth applies to Wittgensteinian totalities and pragmatic truth to Lewisian universes. And it finally argues that this conceptualization lays proper foundations to two-dimensional semantics.
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页码：1335 / 1359
页数：25
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