Equilibrium markup pricing strategies for the dominant retailers under supply chain to chain competition

Markup pricing policies have been widely employed in the retailing industry. Under such policies, a retailer requires a retail margin over the wholesale price charged by the supplier to guarantee her profitability. This paper investigates and compares the performance of two commonly used markup pricing policies, namely, fixed-dollar markup and percentage markup, for the dominant retailers facing chain-to-chain competition. Our results demonstrate that the equilibrium pricing strategy for the dominant retailers seeking to maximise their respective profits is [PP]-strategy (i.e. both retailers select the percentage markup pricing policy), no matter what the demand curve and the level of chain-to-chain competition are. Unfortunately, this equilibrium will get in the prisoner's dilemma since the percentage markup pricing strategy might yield lower profits for the retailers and suppliers compared to its fixed-dollar counterpart when the level of chain-to-chain competition is high enough under the linear demand, which is contrast to the literature. If the criteria for the dominant retailers to select which markup pricing policy to offer is the whole channel's profit obtained under the decentralised decision-making scenario instead of themselves, [PP]-strategy is the dominant strategy and the unique Nash equilibrium of the pricing policy choice game regardless of the competitive intensity under the iso-elastic demand. This result holds true for the linear demand only when the level of chain-to-chain competition is below certain threshold; otherwise, both [FF] (i.e. both retailers select the fixed-dollar markup pricing policy) and [PP] can be the equilibrium pricing strategy.