On revenue sharing contract of supply chain technology innovation under uncertainty market demand
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作者:
Ye Fei
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机构:
S China Univ Technol, Inst Newtype Industrializat, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R ChinaS China Univ Technol, Inst Newtype Industrializat, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R China
Ye Fei
[1
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Li Yi-na
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机构:
S China Univ Technol, Inst Newtype Industrializat, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R ChinaS China Univ Technol, Inst Newtype Industrializat, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R China
Li Yi-na
[1
]
Hu Xiao-ling
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机构:
S China Univ Technol, Inst Newtype Industrializat, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R ChinaS China Univ Technol, Inst Newtype Industrializat, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R China
Hu Xiao-ling
[1
]
机构:
[1] S China Univ Technol, Inst Newtype Industrializat, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R China
A two-layer supply chain made up of a manufacturer and a wholesaler is established. The manufacturer uses revenue sharing contract to induce the wholesaler to make decisions from the optimal revenue of whole supply chain under uncertainty market demand. The wholesale price that the manufacturer makes under revenue sharing contract mechanism is lower than variable unit product cost. The optimal order quantity and technology innovation scale of wholesaler with coordination are larger than that without coordination. At last the data simulation is given.