Cryptographically sound security proofs for basic and public-key Kerberos

被引：0
|
作者：
Backes, M. [1 ]
Cervesato, I.
Jaggard, A. D.
Scedrov, A.
Tsay, J. -K.
机构：
[1] Univ Saarland, D-6600 Saarbrucken, Germany
[2] Tulane Univ, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
[3] Univ Penn, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
来源：
COMPUTER SECURITY - ESORICS 2006, PROCEEDINGS | 2006年 / 4189卷
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号：
081202 ;
摘要：
We present a computational analysis of basic Kerberos and Kerberos with public-key authentication (PKINIT) in which we consider authentication and key secrecy properties. Our proofs rely on the Dolev-Yao style model of Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner, which allows for mapping results obtained symbolically within this model to cryptographically sound proofs if certain assumptions are met. This is the most complex fragment of an industrial protocol that has yet been verified at the computational level. Considering a recently fixed version of PKINIT, we extend symbolic correctness results we previously attained in the Dolev-Yao model to cryptographically sound results in the computational model.
引用
收藏
页码：362 / 383
页数：22
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