Product Market Competition and Internal Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

被引:63
|
作者
Chhaochharia, Vidhi [1 ]
Grinstein, Yaniv [2 ,3 ]
Grullon, Gustavo [4 ]
Michaely, Roni [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA
[2] Interdisciplinary Ctr Herzliya, IL-46150 Herzliyya, Israel
[3] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
[4] Rice Univ, Houston, TX 77252 USA
[5] Cornell Univ, Cornell Tech, Johnson Grad Sch Management, New York, NY 10011 USA
关键词
corporate governance; product market competition; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; FIRM VALUE; COSTS; PERFORMANCE; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2015.2409
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the link between product market competition and internal governance mechanisms. Consistent with the notion that competition plays an important role in aligning incentives within the firm, SOX has led to a larger improvement in the operation of firms in concentrated industries than in nonconcentrated industries. Furthermore, within concentrated industries, the effect is especially pronounced among firms with weaker governance mechanisms prior to SOX. We corroborate these findings using two additional regulatory changes in the United States and abroad. Overall, our results indicate that corporate governance is more important when firms face less product market competition.
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收藏
页码:1405 / 1424
页数:20
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