A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

被引：0
|
作者：
Zhou, Yu [1 ]
机构：
[1] Osaka Univ, Grad Sch Econ, 1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 5600043, Japan
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2017年 / 155卷
关键词：
Rationed equilibrium; Budget constraints; Price controls; Core allocation; Multi-item auction;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We extend the multi-item auction model of Talman and Yang (2008) and Andersson et al. (2015) by considering both unit-demand bidders with budget constraints and price controls on bidding items. Due to these budget and price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium generally fails to exist. To achieve efficiency, we propose a rationed equilibrium whose allocation is in the core. We also construct an ascending auction to find the proposed rationed equilibrium in (pseudo-)polynomial time. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：76 / 79
页数：4
相关论文
共 50 条
12345