Rationalizability and the savage axioms

被引：5
|
作者：
Lo, KC [1 ]
机构：
[1] York Univ, Dept Econ, N York, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
来源：
ECONOMIC THEORY | 2000年 / 15卷 / 03期
关键词：
revealed preference; rationalizability; expected utility; Ellsberg paradox;
D O I：
10.1007/s001990050322
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Suppose there is a finite set of acts defined on a finite state space and a decision maker chooses an act from the set. In this setting, the subjective expected utility model is observationally indistinguishable from all models of preference that satisfy Savage's axiom P3. The result has implications also for rationalizability in strategic games.
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页码：727 / 733
页数：7
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