Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited

被引:30
|
作者
Forges, Francois [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Paris 09, CEREMADE, F-75775 Paris 16, France
关键词
Bayesian rationality; correlated equilibrium; games with incomplete information;
D O I
10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A mistake in "Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete information" motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.
引用
收藏
页码:329 / 344
页数:16
相关论文
共 50 条