Costly punishment does not always increase cooperation

被引:109
|
作者
Wu, Jia-Jia [2 ]
Zhang, Bo-Yu [2 ,3 ]
Zhou, Zhen-Xing [3 ]
He, Qiao-Qiao [2 ]
Zheng, Xiu-Deng [2 ]
Cressman, Ross [1 ]
Tao, Yi [2 ]
机构
[1] Wilfrid Laurier Univ, Dept Math, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, Canada
[2] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Zool, Ctr Computat Biol & Evolut, Key Lab Anim Ecol & Conservat Biol, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China
[3] Beijing Normal Univ, Sch Math Sci, Beijing 100875, Peoples R China
关键词
antisocial punishment; cultural effects; experimental outcome; Prisoner's Dilemma repeated game; reputation; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; PUBLIC GOOD; SOCIETIES; RECIPROCITY; EVOLUTION; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1073/pnas.0905918106
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
In a pairwise interaction, an individual who uses costly punishment must pay a cost in order that the opponent incurs a cost. It has been argued that individuals will behave more cooperatively if they know that their opponent has the option of using costly punishment. We examined this hypothesis by conducting two repeated two-player Prisoner's Dilemma experiments, that differed in their payoffs associated to cooperation, with university students from Beijing as participants. In these experiments, the level of cooperation either stayed the same or actually decreased when compared with the control experiments in which costly punishment was not an option. We argue that this result is likely due to differences in cultural attitudes to cooperation and punishment based on similar experiments with university students from Boston that found cooperation did increase with costly punishment.
引用
收藏
页码:17448 / 17451
页数:4
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