Optimal Auction Model Analysis and Mechanism Design of Indivisible Goods

被引：0
|
作者：
Rao, Congjun [1 ]
Zhao, Yong [1 ]
Bao, Huiling [1 ]
Wang, Qing [1 ]
机构：
[1] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Inst Syst Engn, Wuhan 430074, Peoples R China
来源：
ADVANCES IN NEURAL NETWORKS - ISNN 2009, PT 1, PROCEEDINGS | 2009年 / 5551卷
关键词：
Indivisible goods; optimal auction; mechanism design; DIVISIBLE GOODS;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号：
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要：
In this paper, an optimal auction model that maximizes the seller's expected utility is proposed for a kind of indivisible goods. Firstly, the correlation of bidders' valuations and the asymmetry of the private information are analyzed. Then, the properties of the optimal auction are given. Thirdly, the feasibility of optimal auction is discussed. Finally, an example of the optimal auction is given to show how to apply the discriminatory auction to realize the optimal auction mechanism. Therefore, this paper effectively generalizes the auction models with single-unit.
引用
收藏
页码：1161 / 1170
页数：10
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS
    Rao, Congjun
    Zhao, Yong
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & DECISION MAKING, 2010, 9 (05) : 831 - 845
  • [2] EXCHANGE MODELS WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES OF AUCTION TYPE
    LEVIN, VL
    [J]. DOKLADY AKADEMII NAUK, 1994, 334 (01) : 16 - 19
  • [3] Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods
    Beviá C.
    [J]. Review of Economic Design, 1998, 3 (3) : 195 - 213
  • [4] Population monotonicity in a general model with indivisible goods
    Bevia, C
    [J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1996, 50 (01) : 91 - 97
  • [5] Pareto-Optimal Allocation of Indivisible Goods with Connectivity Constraints
    Igarashi, Ayumi
    Peters, Dominik
    [J]. THIRTY-THIRD AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE / THIRTY-FIRST INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE / NINTH AAAI SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2019, : 2045 - 2052
  • [6] Online double auction mechanism for perishable goods
    Miyashita, Kazuo
    [J]. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS, 2014, 13 (05) : 355 - 367
  • [7] Optimal mechanism design in uniform price auction for VC exit
    Zheng, Jun-Jun
    Zhong, Hong-Bo
    Xu, Ming-Yuan
    [J]. Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice, 2012, 32 (07): : 1429 - 1436
  • [8] Design of optimal double auction mechanism with multi-objectives
    Wang, Xianjia
    Chin, Kwai-Sang
    Yin, Hong
    [J]. EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS, 2011, 38 (11) : 13749 - 13756
  • [9] OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN
    MYERSON, RB
    [J]. MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1981, 6 (01) : 58 - 73
  • [10] Optimal mechanism design for multi-objective double auction
    Yin, Hong
    Wang, Xian-Jia
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF 2006 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MACHINE LEARNING AND CYBERNETICS, VOLS 1-7, 2006, : 207 - +
12345