Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of Explanation

被引:17
|
作者
Colombo, Matteo [1 ]
机构
[1] Tilburg Univ, Tilburg Ctr Log Eth & Philosophy Sci, POB 90153, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
关键词
Explanation; Experimental philosophy; Pluralism; Carnapian explication; Explanatory power; POWER; PROBABILITY; CAUSATION; LOGIC;
D O I
10.1111/cogs.12340
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
This paper brings together results from the philosophy and the psychology of explanation to argue that there are multiple concepts of explanation in human psychology. Specifically, it is shown that pluralism about explanation coheres with the multiplicity of models of explanation available in the philosophy of science, and it is supported by evidence from the psychology of explanatory judgment. Focusing on the case of a norm of explanatory power, the paper concludes by responding to the worry that if there is a plurality of concepts of explanation, one will not be able to normatively evaluate what counts as good explanation.
引用
收藏
页码:503 / 517
页数:15
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