Implementing Optimal Supply of Public Transport The Choice between Tendering and Targeted Subsidies
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作者:
Nilsson, J. -E.
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Swedish Natl Rd & Transport Res Inst VTI, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, Sweden
Ctr Transport Studies, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, SwedenSwedish Natl Rd & Transport Res Inst VTI, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, Sweden
Nilsson, J. -E.
[1
,2
]
Ahlberg, J.
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Swedish Natl Rd & Transport Res Inst VTI, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, Sweden
Ctr Transport Studies, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, SwedenSwedish Natl Rd & Transport Res Inst VTI, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, Sweden
Ahlberg, J.
[1
,2
]
Pyddoke, R.
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机构:
Swedish Natl Rd & Transport Res Inst VTI, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, Sweden
Ctr Transport Studies, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, SwedenSwedish Natl Rd & Transport Res Inst VTI, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, Sweden
Pyddoke, R.
[1
,2
]
机构:
[1] Swedish Natl Rd & Transport Res Inst VTI, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, Sweden
[2] Ctr Transport Studies, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, Sweden
This paper compares two approaches for providing public transport: competitive tendering and targeted subsidies. The subsidy option means that commercial operators charge a fare, and are paid by the public sector principal both per passenger and per bus in service. This is the case since quality (the number of buses) would otherwise be sub-optimal. Under full information, the tendering and targeted subsidies would establish the same welfare-maximising outcome, while subsidies typically are more expensive for taxpayers. The case for targeted subsidies is stronger under an asymmetric information framework.