Implementing Optimal Supply of Public Transport The Choice between Tendering and Targeted Subsidies

被引:0
|
作者
Nilsson, J. -E. [1 ,2 ]
Ahlberg, J. [1 ,2 ]
Pyddoke, R. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Swedish Natl Rd & Transport Res Inst VTI, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, Sweden
[2] Ctr Transport Studies, Box 55685, S-10215 Stockholm, Sweden
关键词
URBAN; SUBSIDIZATION; COMPETITION; MONOPOLY;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper compares two approaches for providing public transport: competitive tendering and targeted subsidies. The subsidy option means that commercial operators charge a fare, and are paid by the public sector principal both per passenger and per bus in service. This is the case since quality (the number of buses) would otherwise be sub-optimal. Under full information, the tendering and targeted subsidies would establish the same welfare-maximising outcome, while subsidies typically are more expensive for taxpayers. The case for targeted subsidies is stronger under an asymmetric information framework.
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页码:21 / 38
页数:18
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