Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games

被引:15
|
作者
Cartwright, Edward [1 ]
Stepanova, Anna [2 ]
Xue, Lian [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] De Montfort Univ, Dept Strateg Management & Mkt, Leicester LE1 9BH, Leics, England
[2] Coventry Univ, Sch Econ Finance & Accounting, Coventry, W Midlands, England
[3] Wuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan, Hubei, Peoples R China
[4] Wuhan Univ, Ctr Behav & Expt Res, Wuhan, Hubei, Peoples R China
基金
英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;
关键词
STATIONARY CONCEPTS; COLD-PRICKLE; WARM-GLOW; PROVISION; COOPERATION;
D O I
10.1111/jpet.12359
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper, we revisit the evidence for framing effects in threshold public good games. Our particular focus is on why the probability of providing the public good appears to be higher in positive, give frames compared with negative, take frames. We show that the impulse balance theory can explain this effect. We also report a new experiment designed to test the predictions of the impulse balance theory. The results of the experiment fit well, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, with our predictions.
引用
收藏
页码:903 / 922
页数:20
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