The Normative Requirement of Means-End Rationality and Modest Bootstrapping

被引:1
|
作者
Cheng-Guajardo, Luis [1 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Philosophy, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
Practical rationality; Instrumental rationality; Autonomy; Bootstrapping;
D O I
10.1007/s10677-013-9455-y
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
"Myth theorists" have recently called the normative requirement of means-end rationality into question. I show that we can accept certain lessons from the Myth Theorists and also salvage our intuition that there is a normative requirement of means-end rationality. I argue that any appeal to a requirement to make our attitudes coherent as such is superfluous and unnecessary in order to vindicate the requirement of means-end rationality and also avoid the problematic conclusion that persons ought to take the means to whatever ends they happen to intend.
引用
收藏
页码:487 / 503
页数:17
相关论文
共 50 条