Judicial lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, constitutional, and political constraints

被引:132
|
作者
Steinberg, RH [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Sch Law, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3176728
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Judicial lawmaking in the WTO is marked by elastic interpretive discourse and constitutional rules that do not serve as a meaningful restraint. Politics, however, constrains both discursive and constitutional latitude, which should alleviate, concerns that WTO judicial lawmaking is so expansive as to undermine the sovereignty of powerful states, create a serious democratic deficit for their citizens, or catalyze withdrawal of their support for the organization.
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页码:247 / 275
页数:29
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