Optimal social security in a dynastic model with human capital externalities, fertility and endogenous growth

被引：24
|
作者：
Yew, Siew Ling [1 ]
Zhang, Jie [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, Singapore 117570, Singapore
[2] Univ Queensland, Sch Econ, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia
来源：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 93卷 / 3-4期
基金：
澳大利亚研究理事会;
关键词：
Social security; Welfare; Fertility; Human capital externalities; Savings; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; CHILDREN; PRODUCTIVITY; CONVERGENCE; EDUCATION; TRANSFERS; ALTRUISM;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.10.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper we investigate the optimal scale of pay-as-you-go social security in a dynastic family model with human capital externalities, fertility and endogenous growth. Human capital externalities reduce the return to human capital investment and hence lead to under-investment in human capital and over-reproduction of the population. If the taste for the number of children is sufficiently weak relative to the taste for the welfare of children, social security can be welfare enhancing by reducing fertility and raising human capital investment per child. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：605 / 619
页数：15
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