Third-Party State Domestic Politics and Conflict Management During Interventions into Civil Conflicts

ObjectiveWhen do third-party states engaged in military support of civil war governments resort to conflict management, such as negotiation or mediation, with rebels? Current research underemphasizes the role of third-party state domestic conditions as precipitating the resort to conflict management. To do so, we formulate two explanations linking third-party state domestic politics to conflict management with rebels: (1) gambling for resurrection, in which a weak third-party state leader eschews conflict management in the pursuit of a victory that will rehabilitate his or her political survival; and (2) cutting losses, in which a weak third-party leader resorts to conflict management to reduce the domestic political costs associated with continued fighting. MethodWe identify a sample of 32 civil conflicts during the 1960-2004 period in which a third-party state deploys troops to defend a central government against a rebellion. We code the timing of negotiation and mediation offers between the third-party and the rebels. We then rely on third-party state economic conditions as a barometer of the political survival that shapes the third-party's resort to conflict management. ResultsA logit analysis supports the cutting losses expectation that third-party states seek conflict management when political survival at home is at risk. ConclusionThe analysis underscores the necessity of incorporating the domestic politics of third-party states in studies of interventions into civil wars and conflict management attempts therein.