Moral and interests From interest funded concept of normativity to moral universalism

Desire-based concepts of practical reason are generally considered incapable of grounding the normativity of universalistic and egalitarian moral rules. This explains the popularity of both non-universalistic conceptions of morality, such as contractarianism, and emphatic notions of practical reason, as in the Kantian tradition. In contrast, I argue that the move from desire-based concepts to universalism is possible if altruistic/benevolent desires are adequately taken into account. Due to the nature of benevolent preferences, which virtually everybody has, far more people than usually thought at least have pro tanto reasons to obey universal and egalitarian norms, moral weakness in many cases resulting only from cognitive deficiencies. I put forward a concept of external reasons compatible with a desire-based theory of practical rationality, which proves a useful tool in the conceptualization of moral rationality as distinct from prudential rationality. Moral rationality, I argue, is based on the desires of the proponent of a moral claim, not on the desires of its addressees.