Pricing for rate allocation in unicast service provisioning is informationally efficient

被引：0
|
作者：
Stoenescu, Tudor Mihai [1 ]
Teneketzis, Demosthenis [1 ]
机构：
[1] CALTECH, Social & Informat Sci Lab, Pasadena, CA 91101 USA
来源：
2005 44TH IEEE CONFERENCE ON DECISION AND CONTROL & EUROPEAN CONTROL CONFERENCE, VOLS 1-8 | 2005年
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号：
0812 ;
摘要：
We establish the informational efficiency of the pricing mechanism for unicast service provisioning, a class of decentralized resource allocation problems that arise in communication networks. We also present instances of network resource allocation problems where users are price takers and pricing mechanisms are not informationally efficient.
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页码：1125 / 1130
页数：6
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