The Political Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts

被引:29
|
作者
Ardagna, Silvia [1 ]
Caselli, Francesco [2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Goldman Sachs, Peterborough Court, London EC4A 2BB, England
[2] London Sch Econ, London W2A 2AE, England
[3] CFM, Cincinnati, OH USA
[4] CEP, London, England
[5] CEPR, London, England
[6] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
INFORMATION; DELIBERATION;
D O I
10.1257/mac.6.4.291
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We review the events that led to the May 2010 and July 2011 bailout agreements. We interpret the bailouts as outcomes of political-economy equilibria. We argue that these equilibria were likely not on the Pareto frontier, and sketch political-economy arguments for why collective policymaking in the Euro area may lead to suboptimal outcomes.
引用
收藏
页码:291 / 323
页数:33
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