On the Limitations of Kant's Idea of Reason of the Enlightenment and the Overcoming of them in Husserl's Phenomenology

Kant is a very important representative of the idea of reason of the Enlightenment and holds a special position in the movement of Enlightenment. This is not only due to the fact that he has taken over the heritage of the Enlightenment in a conscious way, but also that he has made two extremely significant transformations of it, which lie in the limitations of the application of reason, that is, firstly, the application of reason is divided into "public application" and "private application", among which the latter undergoes a relative restriction; secondly, theoretical reason is distinguished from practical one, among which the former's application undergoes a restriction in two aspects: Absolutely restricting a direct relationship between reason and aesthetic object on the one hand, absolutely restricting the transcendental application of pure principles of understanding on the other hand. It seems that Kant's reform of the applications of reason is very deep and initial, but in fact it contains internal contradictions. From Husserl's perspective of transcendental phenomenology we could find out that the problematic of these contradictions originates from Kant's rigid differentiation between sensibility and understanding and his artificial separation of the theoretical reason from the practical one.