Optimal formation rules for patent pools

被引：54
|
作者：
Brenner, Steffen [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Humboldt Univ, Dept Econ, Inst Management, D-10178 Berlin, Germany
[2] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源：
ECONOMIC THEORY | 2009年 / 40卷 / 03期
关键词：
R&D cooperation; Endogenous coalition formation; Optimal coalitions; Antitrust; Patent thicket; COALITION STRUCTURES;
D O I：
10.1007/s00199-008-0379-z
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Patent pools in the framework of Lerner and Tirole (Am Econ Rev 94:691-711, 2004) may enhance or reduce social welfare. This paper presents a pool formation mechanism which prevents welfare decreasing pool equilibria to emerge, and which encourages welfare enhancing pools to form. In order to destabilize welfare decreasing pools, forcing coalitions members to offer individual licenses in parallel to the pool has been suggested. I show that in general, this mechanism is not an efficient antitrust tool. However, the mechanism combined with exclusive pool membership avoids stability problems of welfare enhancing pools, while it creates instability of welfare decreasing pools.
引用
收藏
页码：373 / 388
页数：16
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