Optimal Social Insurance with Linear Income Taxation

被引:1
|
作者
Bovenberg, Lans [1 ]
Sorensen, Peter Birch [2 ]
机构
[1] Tilburg Univ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[2] Univ Copenhagen, DK-1455 Copenhagen, Denmark
来源
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 111卷 / 02期
关键词
Disability insurance; optimal taxation; moral hazard; redistribution; labor supply; skill groups; H21; H55; INFORMATION; ECONOMIES;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9442.2009.01563.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study optimal social insurance aimed at insuring disability risk in the presence of linear income taxation. Optimal disability insurance benefits rise with previous earnings. Optimal insurance is incomplete even though disability risks are exogenous and verifiable so that moral hazard in disability insurance is absent. Imperfect insurance is optimal because it encourages workers to insure themselves against disability by working and saving more, thereby alleviating the distortionary impact of the redistributive income tax on labor supply and savings.
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页码:251 / 275
页数:25
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