Steps Toward a Zoology of Mind

被引:2
|
作者
Baeten, Elizabeth [1 ]
机构
[1] Emerson Coll, Boston, MA 02116 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY | 2014年 / 28卷 / 02期
关键词
naturalistic philosophy of mind; embodied cognition; embedded cognition; W; T; Rockwell; mind and natural selection;
D O I
10.5325/jspecphil.28.2.0107
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Over the past several decades there have been robust attempts at crafting descriptions of mind that overcome the legacy of Cartesianism. W. Teed Rockwell puts the body as a nexus of interlocking systems at the center of his account of cognition, effectively dissolving the tie of mind/brain and the problems that follow such an equation. Though Rockwell's project is promising, his phenomenological/Deweyan approach leads him to reject realism and, consequently, to reject an evolutionary role in cognition. On offer is a naturalistic account of mind that begins with the animal embedded in ecosystemic constitutional relations-a zoological account of mind.
引用
收藏
页码:107 / 129
页数:23
相关论文
共 50 条