MANAGEMENT OF DECISION-MAKING MECHANISMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CUBAN ROCKET CRISIS

The present paper aims to follow and analyze and follow perception in the geopolitical and geostrategical context of international relations during the Cold War; the case study chosen in order to apply an interpretation to the perception is represented by the Soviet rocket crisis in Cuba. In an an attempt to underline the significant values of the concept of "perception" in international relations in general, and in international relations during the Cold War in particular, as well as to identify essential aspects related to other notions characteristic for geostrategy, such as the concept of "frog leap", applicable to the dynamics of the Soviet rocket crisis, we have decided to use the descriptive empirical research method with a subject that lies, from this standpoint, on the border between geopolitics and international relations. The objective of this research will also be, if possible, to attempt to find, follow and analyze the gravest perception errors occured during the tensions in October 1962 or preceding the crisis, as well as the harmful effects they were hiding with regards to interpreting and implementing actions and gestures of external politics, on both a national and international level, in the decision units belonging to the two superpowers.