AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON THE RELEVANCE AND SCOPE OF NATIONALITY AS A COORDINATION DEVICE

被引:13
|
作者
Stoddard, Olga [1 ]
Leibbrandt, Andreas [1 ]
机构
[1] Monash Univ, Dept Econ, Clayton, Vic 3800, Australia
关键词
ULTIMATUM GAME; BEHAVIOR; CULTURE; COOPERATION; IDENTITY; PREFERENCES;
D O I
10.1111/ecin.12097
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In a period marked by extensive cross-national interactions, nationality may present an important focal point that individuals coordinate on. This study uses an experimental approach to study whether nationality serves as a coordination device. We let subjects from Japan, Korea, and China play coordination games in which we vary information about their partner. The results show that nationality serves as a coordination device if common nationality is the only piece of information available to the subjects. The strength of this device is nationality-dependent and diminishes when participants are provided with additional information about their partner. We also find that subjects are likely to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium at about the same rate if the partner has a different nationality than if nationality is unknown.
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页码:1392 / 1407
页数:16
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