Strategic responses to institutional change: Parties, committees and multiple referral

被引:5
|
作者
Bawn, K
机构
[1] University of California, Department of Political Science, Los Angeles
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF00153232
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Although multiple referral seems to remove committees' gatekeeping power, strategic opportunities exist for motivated committees to dominate late stages of the legislative process. Multiple referral does not necessarily diminish the power of committees, but it does solve an important problem for the leadership. If the goal of the leadership is to maximize the number of majority party members reelected, it will make procedural decisions to favor groups within the majority party that care the most about the issue. Multiple referral provides the leadership with information about preference intensity when jurisdiction is unclear. The committee willing to exert the most effort for a bill, even if this effort takes the form of strategic behavior, is the committee most affected by the issue.
引用
收藏
页码:239 / 258
页数:20
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