Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism

被引:51
|
作者
Cheibub, Jose Antonio [1 ]
Elkins, Zachary [2 ]
Ginsburg, Tom [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Illinois, Dept Polit Sci, Urbana, IL 61801 USA
[2] Univ Texas Austin, Dept Govt, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[3] Univ Chicago, Sch Law, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
VETO PLAYERS; ORGANIZATION; INSTITUTIONS; SYSTEMS; POWER;
D O I
10.1017/S000712341300032X
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The presidential-parliamentary distinction is foundational to comparative politics and at the center of a large theoretical and empirical literature. However, an examination of constitutional texts suggests a fair degree of heterogeneity within these categories with respect to important institutional attributes. These observations indicate that the classic presidential-parliamentary distinction, and the semi-presidential category, may not be systemic. This article investigates whether the defining attributes that separate presidential and parliamentary constitutions predict other attributes that are stereotypically associated with these institutional models. The results suggest the need for considerable skepticism of the 'systemic' nature of the classification. Indeed, the results imply that in order to predict the powers of a country's executive and legislature, it is more useful to know where and when the constitution was written than whether the country has a presidential or parliamentary system.
引用
收藏
页码:515 / 544
页数:30
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