New technologies, old distinctions: What's wrong with cloning

This essay presents an argument against human cloning. The thrust of the argument is that cloning is morally impermissible inasmuch as it violates the dignity of the clone who, as a person, is as yet an end in himself or herself. This violation of human dignity is made possible by a confusion between what Aristotle describes as things that are "by nature" and things that are "by art." By attempting to "make" a person, the technique of cloning superimposes the logic of art upon the domain of natural reproduction. Corresponding to the efficient, formal, and final causes in art are three specific ways in which the dignity of the clone is violated. Notably, however, these same three violations of human dignity occur in the attitudes and practices of parents in natural reproduction, indicating that the problem of cloning is but a symptom of a more deep-seated malaise.