Funding Sources and Excess CEO Compensation in Not-for-Profit Organizations

被引:16
|
作者
Gaver, Jennifer J. [1 ]
Im, S. Mary [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Georgia, Athens, GA 30602 USA
[2] Calif State Polytech Univ Pomona, Pomona, CA 91768 USA
关键词
not-for-profit organizations; governance; agency costs; CEO compensation; NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS; AGENCY; GOVERNANCE; EFFICIENCY;
D O I
10.2308/acch-50588
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the relation between funding composition and excess CEO compensation in not-for-profit organizations (NFPs). Our sample consists of 105,400 observations from 15,412 unique organizations during 1992 to 2007. The results suggest that excess CEO compensation is negatively related to funding from government grants, government-paid program service revenues, and public donations. Excess CEO compensation is positively related to funding from investment income. Our findings generally support the view that the demand for monitoring by fund providers is associated with agency costs in NFP organizations.
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页码:1 / 16
页数:16
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