Tamper-Resistant Authentication System with Side-Channel Attack Resistant AES and PUF using MDR-ROM

As a threat of security devices, side-channel attacks (SCAs) and invasive attacks have been identified in the last decade. The SCA reveals a secret key on a cryptographic circuit by measuring power consumption or electromagnetic radiation during the cryptographic operations. We have proposed the MDR-ROM scheme as the low-power and small-area counter-measure against SCAs. Meanwhile, secret data in a nonvolatile memory is analyzed by invasive attacks, and the cryptographic device is counterfeited and cloned by an adversary. We proposed to combine the MDR-ROM scheme with the Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) technique, which is expected as the counter-measure against the counterfeit, and the prototype chip was fabricated with a 180nm CMOS technology. In addition, the keyless entry demonstration system was produced in order to present the effectiveness of SCA resistance and PUF technique. Our experiments confirmed that this demonstration system achieved sufficient tamper resistance.