Management and Safe Nuclear Power Plants

Technology on an industrial scale has long since recognized the Man-Technology-Organization (MTO) phenomenon. A lot of effort is being invested into running risky technologies in a "fault tolerant" mode: Human weaknesses are to be accommodated by technology acting automatically, thus avoiding damage. Also in the nuclear field, research is to be conducted permanently in the interest of "fault tolerance." However,,today and probably also in the future, technology does not function in the absence of people. Management seems to be indispensable. Nationally, the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) published "Principles of Safety Management Systems" on June 29, 2004. The new code of nuclear rules and regulalations planned by the BMU contains a "Module S, Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants: Requirements for Safety Management." Especially from the Chernobyl accident to this day, the licensees of German nuclear power plants have stressed their interest in safety. They connect it with the economy of plant operation, establishing a link with high availability as proof of a high level of safety. Without engaging in pettifogging, recourse must be made to the sentence in the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles which demands that "safety is not compromised by other requirements or demands." Does this run counter to linking plant safety and plant availability in an "integrated management system?" Or is it precisely the community of licensees' interests in high safety plus high availability which constitutes an indispensable incentive for an efficient safety management system?