Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown

被引：35
|
作者：
Prat, Julien [1 ,2 ]
Jovanovic, Boyan [3 ]
机构：
[1] CNRS, CREST, F-75700 Paris, France
[2] Barcelona GSE, IAE, Barcelona, Spain
[3] NYU, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10003 USA
来源：
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 2014年 / 9卷 / 03期
关键词：
Principal-agent model; optimal contract; learning; private information; reputation; career; D82; D83; E24; J41; RECURSIVE FORMULATION; COMPENSATION; INFORMATION; MODEL;
D O I：
10.3982/TE1439
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is opposite to that in the literature on career concerns in which incentives via short-term contracts become harder to provide as the agent's quality is revealed over time.
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页码：865 / 914
页数：50
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