Risk-based deposit insurance, deposit rates and bank failures: Evidence from Russia

被引:1
|
作者
Chernykh, Lucy [1 ]
Kotomin, Vladimir [2 ]
机构
[1] Clemson Univ, Clemson, SC USA
[2] Illinois State Univ, Normal, IL USA
关键词
Risk-based deposit insurance; Bank moral hazard; Deposit pricing; Bank failures; MARKET DISCIPLINE; PRUDENTIAL REGULATION; COMMERCIAL-BANKS; MORAL HAZARD; COMPETITION; DETERMINANTS; FRAGILITY; BEHAVIOR; CRISES; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106483
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using the Russian banking system as a laboratory, we study the effect of a switch from fixed-rate deposit insurance to a risk-based system with premia tied to insured deposit rates offered by a bank. After the switch, increases in bank risk lead to reduced reliance on insured deposits, private banks without ex-cessive capital stop raising insured deposit rates to fund loan growth, and the cost of insured deposits becomes a predictor of bank failures (beyond the CAMEL variables). Offering insured deposit rates notably above the market becomes a last resort to banks. The results suggest that risk-based deposit insurance schemes discouraging high insured deposit rates may help reduce bank moral hazard and improve finan-cial stability. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数:13
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