Analysis of the Behavior of Electric Vehicle Charging Stations with Renewable Generations

In this paper, we study the competitive interactions between electric vehicle charging stations (EVeSs) with renewable electricity generation facilities (REGFs). As electric vehicles (EVs) become more popular, there will be a competition between neighboring EVeSs to attract more EVs. Therefore, an EVeS is likely to set its electricity price by taking into account the competition with neighboring EVeSs, such that its revenue is maximized. We model the competitive interactions between EVeSs by using game theory. In this paper, we show that the game played by EVeSs is a supermodular game and there exists a unique pure Nash equilibrium for best response algorithms with arbitrary initial policy. Simulation results confirm the convergence of the game between EVeSs. The results also verify that it is beneficial for both EVs and EVeSs to have REGFs and all EVeSs will have REGFs in the long run.