Government versus Bankers: Sovereign Debt Negotiations in Porfirian Mexico, 1888-1910

被引:4
|
作者
Weller, Leonardo [1 ]
机构
[1] EESP FGV, Sao Paulo Sch Econ, BR-01332000 Sao Paulo, SP, Brazil
来源
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY | 2015年 / 75卷 / 04期
关键词
GLOBALIZATION; MARKETS; ECONOMY; BONDS;
D O I
10.1017/S0022050715001564
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article assesses how the government of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910) negotiated sovereign loans. Mexico was a serial defaulter that established a good reputation and issued bonds abroad at progressively better conditions. Based on new archival material, the article demonstrates that borrowing terms improved not only because of sounder fundamentals, but also due to the efforts of high officials to negotiate with debt underwriters. The Mexicans never accepted a patron bank and used the offers from American banks to bargain with European competitors. They acted according to the government's reputation, the underwriters' status, and the ideology of the Porfirian state.
引用
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页码:1030 / 1057
页数:28
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