Jumping the queue: Nepotism and public-sector pay

被引:10
|
作者
Chassamboulli, Andri [1 ]
Gomes, Pedro [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cyprus, Dept Econ, CY-1678 Nicosia, Cyprus
[2] Birkbeck Univ London, Dept Econ Math & Stat, Malet St, London WC1E 7HX, England
[3] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Econ, Calle Madrid 126, Getafe 28903, Spain
关键词
Public-sector employment; Nepotism; Public-sector wages; Unemployment; Queues; LABOR-MARKET; EMPLOYMENT;
D O I
10.1016/j.red.2020.07.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We set up a model with search and matching frictions to understand the effects of employment and wage policies, as well as nepotism in hiring in the public sector, on unemployment and rent seeking. Conditional on inefficiently high public-sector wages, more nepotism in public-sector hiring lowers the unemployment rate because it limits the size of queues for public-sector jobs. Wage and employment policies impose an endogenous constraint on the number of workers the government can hire through connections. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:344 / 366
页数:23
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