On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness

被引：1
|
作者：
Bergantinos, Gustavo [1 ]
Masso, Jordi [2 ]
Neme, Alejandro [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Vigo, Dept Stat & Operat Res, Vigo 36310, Pontevedra, Spain
[2] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, Dept Econ & Hist Econ, Barcelona Grad Sch Econ, Campus UAB,Edifici B, Bellaterra 08193, Spain
[3] Univ Nacl San Luis, Inst Matemat Aplicada San Luis, CONICET, Ejercito Andes 950, RA-5700 San Luis, Argentina
来源：
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2017年 / 48卷 / 04期
关键词：
PUBLIC-GOODS; ALLOCATION; COMMITTEES; MECHANISMS; EXIT;
D O I：
10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.
引用
收藏
页码：857 / 875
页数：19
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
    Gustavo Bergantiños
    Jordi Massó
    Alejandro Neme
    [J]. Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, 48 : 857 - 875
  • [2] On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
    Roy, Souvik
    Sadhukhan, Soumyarup
    [J]. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 99
  • [3] On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
    Gustavo Bergantiños
    Jordi Massó
    Alejandro Neme
    [J]. Theory and Decision, 2018, 84 : 83 - 97
  • [4] On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
    Bergantinos, Gustavo
    Masso, Jordi
    Neme, Alejandro
    [J]. THEORY AND DECISION, 2018, 84 (01) : 83 - 97
  • [5] Oligarchy for social choice correspondences and strategy-proofness
    Tanaka, Y
    [J]. THEORY AND DECISION, 2003, 55 (03) : 273 - 287
  • [6] A decomposition of strategy-proofness
    Nozomu Muto
    Shin Sato
    [J]. Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 47 : 277 - 294
  • [7] Oligarchy for Social Choice Correspondences and Strategy-Proofness
    Yasuhito Tanaka
    [J]. Theory and Decision, 2003, 55 : 273 - 287
  • [8] A decomposition of strategy-proofness
    Muto, Nozomu
    Sato, Shin
    [J]. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2016, 47 (02) : 277 - 294
  • [9] Strategy-proofness in the Large
    Azevedo, Eduardo M.
    Budish, Eric
    [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2019, 86 (01): : 81 - 116
  • [10] Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
    Erdamar, Bora
    Sanver, M. Remzi
    Sato, Shin
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2017, 106 : 227 - 238
12345