Blowing the whistle

被引：82

作者：

Apesteguia, Jose

Dufwenberg, Martin ^{[1
]}

Selten, Reinhard

机构：

[1] Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

[2] Univ Arizona, Econ Sci Lab, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

[3] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ & Business, Barcelona 08005, Spain

[4] Univ Bonn, Expt Econ Lab, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2007年 / 31卷 / 01期

关键词：

anti-trust; leniency; immunity; amnesty; blow the whistle; cartels; price competition; Bertrand model; experiment communication;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, experimentally.

引用

页码：143 / 166

页数：24

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