Intersubjectivity and transcendental idealism in Husserl

The central aim of this article is to discuss whether Husserl could effectively present an ultimate understanding of intersubjectivity in a strictly transcendental way and thus whether Husserl was able to definitively overcome any form of solipsism. The position that I intend to defend is that Husserl is able to present a coherent understanding of transcendentally understood intersubjectivity from a deepening of transcendental reduction processes. It will also be argued that the explication of the transcendental status of intersubjectivity does not in any way contradict the phenomenological transcendental idealism proposed by Husserl. On the contrary, it will be shown that the understanding of the transcendental status of intersubjectivity contributes to a better and more adequate characterization of what is the field of phenomenological transcendental idealism in Husserl. In order to carry out this work, the texts of Cartesian Meditations IV and V will be taken as the object of analysis.