Information Asymmetry and Investor Valuations of Initial Public Offerings: Two Dimensions of Organizational Reputation as Stock Market Signals

被引:9
|
作者
Liu, Yang [1 ]
Cheng, Peng [2 ]
OuYang, Zhe [3 ]
Wang, Ao [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sci & Technol China, Sch Management, Hefei, Peoples R China
[2] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Dept Advertising, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[3] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Dept Business Adm, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[4] Univ Sci & Technol China, Dept Business Adm, Hefei, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
initial public offering; investor attention; organizational reputation; signaling; EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION; ATTENTION; MEDIA; LEGITIMACY; CHARACTER; SELECTION; FOUNDERS; IPOS;
D O I
10.1017/mor.2019.28
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
The uncertainty and information asymmetry that surround initial public offering firms (IPOs) often introduce difficulties for potential investors to discern organizational value, thereby leading to 'underpricing'. Using the signaling theory, we investigate the role of organizational reputation in the underpricing of IPOs. We analyze 463 initial public offerings in China from the period of 2010 to 2016 and find thatbeing known for qualityandgeneralized favorabilitydimensions of reputation are negatively related with underpricing on the first day of trading. In addition, we find that the negative effects of organizational reputation on underpricing are mediated by investor attention.
引用
收藏
页码:945 / 964
页数:20
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