On essential, (strictly) perfect equilibria

被引：2
|
作者：
Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol [1 ]
机构：
[1] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Econ, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2014年 / 54卷
关键词：
Infinite normal-form game; Essential equilibrium; Perfect equilibrium; Strictly perfect equilibrium; Equilibrium existence; Payoff security; DISCONTINUOUS GAMES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.010
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
It is known that generic games within certain collections of infinite-action normal-form games have only essential equilibria. We point to a difficulty in showing that essential equilibria in generic games are (strictly) perfect, and we identify collections of games whose generic members have only essential and (strictly) perfect equilibria. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：157 / 162
页数：6
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